Mayow Wynell Mayow addresses his 1869 letter directly to the Lord High Chancellor, framing his argument as a defense of the existing Table of Degrees against the Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Bill. He immediately narrows his focus to a single verse—Leviticus 18:18—which opponents of the prohibition had interpreted as tacitly permitting marriage with a deceased wife’s sister after the first wife’s death. Mayow disputes this reading by insisting that the verse’s phrase “beside the other, in her life time” does not imply a posthumous allowance; rather, it reinforces a standing prohibition. His method is to treat the biblical text as a legal document, parsing its clauses with the precision of a statute.

The Scriptural Argument Narrowed

Mayow concedes that the entire debate, from a Scriptural standpoint, hinges on Leviticus 18:18. He notes that if the verse were absent or differently understood, “there would hardly be a question raised” about the incestuous nature of such unions. His opponent’s case rests on the assumption that forbidding a marriage while the first wife lives implies permission after her death. Mayow counters by arguing that the verse is a specific prohibition against taking a wife “to her sister” during the first wife’s lifetime, not a general rule with a loophole. He does not engage with broader historical or cultural arguments, instead treating the verse as a self-contained legal clause whose meaning must be determined by its wording and context within Leviticus 18.

A Hypothetical Act of Parliament

To illustrate his interpretation, Mayow constructs a fictional statute that mirrors the structure he believes underlies Leviticus 18 and Deuteronomy 25. His imagined act begins with a schedule of prohibited degrees (based on Archbishop Parker’s table), then adds a section requiring a brother to marry his deceased brother’s childless widow—the Law of the Levirate. A third section specifies that this requirement does not apply if it would compel a man to marry his wife’s sister while his wife is alive. Mayow insists that no reader would interpret this third section as repealing the prohibition against marrying a wife’s sister after her death; it merely creates a limited exception for the levirate case. The analogy is designed to show that Leviticus 18:18 functions similarly, restricting only the timing of a marriage that is already forbidden.

The Levirate as a Partial Exception

Mayow repeatedly emphasizes that the Law of the Levirate (Deuteronomy 25:5–6) is a “partial exception” to the general prohibition against marrying a brother’s wife, not a repeal. He argues that the same logic applies to the sister-in-law case: the levirate law might, in specific circumstances, permit a man to marry his wife’s sister (if she is also his brother’s widow), but this is due to the levirate provision, not to any implied permission in Leviticus 18:18. The verse, he contends, remains a full prohibition in all other situations. By distinguishing between the source of the exception (the levirate law) and the standing rule (Leviticus 18:18), Mayow aims to undermine the claim that the verse tacitly sanctions marriage with a deceased wife’s sister.

Mayow’s letter is a tightly focused legal-theological argument that never strays from its chosen verse. Readers should note that the excerpts do not include his treatment of other biblical passages or historical church rulings, so the full scope of his case remains unknown. The work is best approached as a specimen of Victorian scriptural polemic, where a single clause is subjected to the kind of scrutiny normally reserved for a statute. Those interested in the broader debate may wish to consult the opposing pamphlets that Mayow alludes to but does not quote.